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Abstract. The clinical sciences have arguably the most stringent security 
demands on the adoption and roll-out of collaborative e-Infrastructure 
solutions such as those based upon Grid-based middleware. Experiences 
from the Medical Research Council (MRC) funded Virtual Organisations 
for Trials and Epidemiological Studies (VOTES) project and numerous 
other real world security driven projects at the UK e-Science National e-
Science Centre (NeSC – www.nesc.ac.uk) have shown that whilst advanced 
Grid security and middleware solutions now offer capabilities to address 
many of the distributed data and security challenges in the clinical domain, 
the real clinical world as typified by organizations such as the National 
Health Service (NHS) in the UK are extremely wary of adoption of such 
technologies: firewalls; ethics; information governance, software validation, 
and the actual realities of existing infrastructures need to be considered from 
the outset. Based on these experiences we present a novel data linkage and 
anonymisation infrastructure that has been developed with close co-
operation of the various stakeholders in the clinical domain (including the 
NHS) that addresses their concerns and satisfies the needs of the academic 
clinical research community. We demonstrate the implementation of this 
infrastructure through a representative clinical study on chronic diseases in 
Scotland. 
Keywords: Grid security, data linkage, anonymisation, virtual organizations. 
1. Introduction 
Clinical research and healthcare provision should be 
complementary. Understanding the impact of a particular 
treatment on individuals, or the assessment of drug therapies and 
their potential side-effects on large scale cohorts, or indeed 
moving towards the promise of personalized post-genomic e-
Health, offers great potential for new and improved clinical 
healthcare support [1]. In this space, software and IT systems 
play a hugely important role in potentially enabling the myriad of 
data sets and software systems categorizing clinical systems 
today, to be harnessed to tackle a variety of clinical research 
questions which can in turn help improve healthcare systems and 
ultimately, patient care.  
One way in which this vision has been addressed is through e-
Science and Grid-based middleware solutions. Whilst much 
Grid-based middleware has been targeted to addressing 
computationally bound research, as exemplified by the Large 
Hadron Collider (LHC) [2] and the establishment of major 
software infrastructures such as the Enabling Grids for e-Science 
(EGEE) software stack [3] which can provide seamless access to 
extensive high performance computing (HPC) computational 
resources in the search for the Higgs-Boson.  The Grid-model of 
providing seamless access to a range of digital resources, be they 
computers, data sets or other resources, is a compelling one and 
applicable to many research domains however. The post-
genomic life sciences in particular have much to be gained 
through the seamless models of Grid-based data access and 
usage of biological, clinical, social, geospatial and other data 
sets. Examples and proof of concept systems demonstrating 
the Grid-vision in the clinical and related disciplines are 
described in [4-6]. One fundamental difference between these 
systems and HPC-oriented Grid projects is the focus upon 
finer grained security. Whilst many domains require 
authentication of individuals supported for example through 
X509-based public key infrastructures (PKI), many domains 
(including the clinical domain) require finer-grained access 
control models.  
[7-9] have extensively documented the security and 
usability problems associated with Grid-based X509 based 
public key infrastructures (PKI) models [10]. Yet the PKI 
based model is not without its advantages, perhaps the most 
importance of these are in the support for single sign-on, i.e. 
where the user is only required to authenticate once and can 
subsequently access resources across multiple heterogeneous 
sites. Coupling PKI-based authentication with additional 
access control mechanisms reflecting site-specific access and 
usage (authorization) policies capturing what a user is 
allowed to do on a local resource offers considerable 
possibilities.   
Example systems showing how the adoption of role based 
access control (RBAC) [11] solutions such as PERMIS [12] 
using federated identity providers and attribute authorities 
based upon the Internet2 Shibboleth technologies 
(shibboleth.internet2.edu) or centralized attribute authorities 
such as VOMS [13] have demonstrated how seamless linkage 
to distributed services and data sets can be supported. 
Furthermore, other authorization approaches including 
identity based access control (IBAC) models [14] and process 
based access control (PBAC) [15] have been demonstrated to 
support finer grained access control policies that can be 
linked to distributed resources. Whilst each of these solutions 
has their own particular advantages and disadvantages and all 
have been demonstrated to support advanced authorization 
capabilities, it is the case that the real world as represented 
by organizations such as the NHS are not equipped with 
expertise in the deployment and usage of these technologies; 
nor are they immersed in the world of Grid middleware. 
Thus despite numerous demonstrators showing how such 
systems can support the vision of secure seamless access to 
distributed clinical services and data sets, the reality is that 
the real world of patient health care will simply not allow the 
deployment of such technologies. There are several reasons for 
this. Perhaps the most importance of these is the fact that the data 
owners, data providers, ethical bodies amongst numerous other 
stakeholders in the clinical space are naturally extremely wary of 
any new middleware solutions which have yet to be completely 
proven to be robust, reliable and rigorous enough to enforce all 
access decisions.  
Put another way, site autonomy in the clinical domain is not 
just a basic requirement that lip service is given to, but an 
absolute essential consideration which must be strictly adhered to 
with potentially legal consequences if not. In short, there is at 
present a lack of real trust in these solutions and their usage for 
live access to real clinical data for real patients. Yet the vision of 
the Grid in supporting seamless, secure access to distributed 
resources and the challenges facing healthcare providers are well 
aligned. Rather than attempting to convince healthcare providers 
such as the NHS to install a particular set of middleware and 
embrace authorization technologies and ultimately trust that the 
combination of these solutions will work, new access paradigms 
are required. These need to be aligned with the working practices 
and understanding of the stakeholders in the clinical domain and 
ultimately be fail-proof. In this paper we present a model and 
implementation of a system providing secure access and linkage 
of clinical data for research purposes that addresses many of the 
worries and concerns of the clinical healthcare community.  
We note that in developing this solution, we have worked over 
the last 4 years in close co-operation with the NHS to establish 
degrees of trust through various collaborative projects. 
Fundamentally the solution has been developed to address a 
given premise: namely, those healthcare providers do not exist to 
keep data private, but to provide healthcare. Through improved 
research practices and better understanding of the possibilities 
that exist in data access and usage improving healthcare and 
patient care more generally will be realized.  
The rest of this paper is structured as follows. Section 2 
provides an overview of some of the key concerns facing 
healthcare providers in making clinical data sets available for 
research purposes. Section 3 describes the architecture and key 
components of the virtual anonymisation Grid for access to 
clinical research data (Vanguard), and an overview of the typical 
interactions that take place in supporting secure data linkage and 
anonymisation. Section 4 describes the implementation of the 
Vanguard system and its application in a given study. Finally we 
draw some conclusions of the work as a whole and outline plans 
for the future. 
2. Data Sharing Challenges in the Clinical Domain 
Irrespective of the trust models or security infrastructures in 
place or guarantees that any middleware developers might make 
about the robustness and usability of their software and security 
solutions, it is the case that clinical data providers in the vast 
majority of cases, will simply not risk direct access to their data 
sets for research purposes. Instead, many clinical healthcare 
providers will often produce aggregated data sets and make these 
available through less secure and often ad-hoc approaches.  CDs 
sent through the post containing unencrypted clinical data or 
unencrypted email attachments are two of the worst case 
scenarios for data sharing yet are not uncommon in practice. 
 To counter such positions of data guardians requires several 
considerations to be taken on board. Firstly, any solutions have 
to empower the stakeholders and not remove their essential 
roles in the access to and management of their data sets. As 
noted, site autonomy is not just a requirement but a fact that 
if violated will result in potential legal consequences. It is 
essential that this autonomy has to be beyond simply 
installing Grid middleware and security software, and 
managing it locally since few data providers are likely to 
wish to explore the currently complex offerings of Grid 
technology providers.  
Secondly and following on from the first consideration, any 
solutions have to be based upon pragmatic considerations of 
usability and accept that any developed systems must fit in to 
existing clinical systems and practices. Rolling out Grid 
based X509-based public key infrastructures for 
authentication augmented with advanced authorization 
infrastructures has to be considered from clinical provider 
perspectives. It is the case that the majority of clinical 
software systems have not been developed with security in 
mind. Or more precisely, they have not been developed with 
providing secure, authorized access to potentially external 
collaborators in mind. Rather healthcare providers are 
typically busy working with a range of legacy systems far 
removed from the more exotic, Grid vision and associated 
middleware. These systems often have a history of decades of 
development and enhancements and cannot simply be 
replaced with a new middleware. 
Thirdly, it is essential that any software solutions deployed 
on live clinical systems have to be designed, deployed, 
managed and monitored more generally with the worst case 
scenarios and risk assessment and threat analysis in mind. 
Compromises of clinical information which can lead to 
erroneous treatments being given are simply not tenable. 
Other equally damaging scenarios also exist however, e.g. 
where clinical data is accessed and used without express 
permission, or that it is linked with identifying data that 
results in disclosure of patient data. Such cases destroy public 
trust in clinical research and associated IT technologies. 
Given all of this, direct access through NHS firewalls to 
live clinical data systems will simply not take place (other 
than potentially in small, closely contained scenarios where 
NHS and research collaborators are working on test systems 
for example). For the larger challenges of looking at national-
level epidemiology or recruiting large patient cohorts for a 
clinical trial say, this model will simply not scale. 
Instead, new models of data access and usage are required 
which meet the stringent requirements of the stakeholders in 
this domain yet address the needs of the clinical research 
community. Fundamentally, challenges facing clinical 
research with cautious data providers and associated 
stakeholders include:  
• How can it be ensured that the research is ethically 
driven? 
• How can it be ensured that these data sets will not be 
disclosed to others?  
• How can it be ensured that this data will not be linked 
with other data resources which may include identifying 
information?  
• How can we guarantee that the NHS systems themselves 
will not be compromised through malicious attacks or 
accidental disclosure risks? 
The first bullet point is currently addressed in the UK through 
independent clinical and related expert arbiters. These are 
typically represented by independent ethics panels which can be 
local or regional/national depending upon the nature of the 
research proposed. These panels will typically have legal and 
patient information advisory group members also. Their role is 
typically to ensure that the research proposed is (or will be) 
beneficial to patients and, where any potential risks exist, that 
these are fully documented and ultimately used to decide 
whether the research should proceed. These panels are often 
supported by Caldicott guardians who act as independent clinical 
experts who can advise on the nature of the study being proposed 
and assess whether it is scientifically and ethically sound. 
This process is inherently human driven and we believe should 
never be automated by a software process. However once ethical 
go ahead is obtained, it should be the case that systems are 
available to make the required data sets available in a secure 
environment. 
The second bullet point can be addressed in different ways. 
Firstly, if direct trust exists between clinical data providers and 
the clinical researchers undertaking a given study, then the 
dangers of disclosure are minimized. Disclosure of data by a 
researcher will destroy trust and can have legal consequences 
and/or prohibit future access to clinical data. Alternatively, a 
common model is to only release anonymised data. However 
whilst anonymisation or pseudo-anonymisation models help to 
de-identify data by for example removing certain identifying 
information, it is notoriously difficult to truly anonymise clinical 
data in the most general case and make it still useful for the end 
user scientists. Furthermore in the post-genomic age, where there 
is a move towards personalized e-Health and greater emphasis on 
genetic information and data, further issues arise since the data 
by its very nature is identifying. 
Nevertheless for many research questions it is often not 
necessary to know detailed identifying information. Rather, for 
feasibility studies in a given clinical trial say, having knowledge 
of how many patients in a given region suffer from a particular 
chronic disease is sufficient. 
Following on from this and addressing the third bullet point is 
the possibility of linking these data sets with other data sets to 
obtain further information and potentially, to identify individuals 
in a given clinical data set. Ideally it should be the case that trust 
between clinical researchers would mean that this danger should 
not arise, i.e. it is typically part of the ethical agreements that are 
defined in a given study protocol. However, placing such trust on 
clinical researchers (who are often based act universities and not 
in themselves clinicians or healthcare providers) is not sufficient 
and any information that could potentially be used for further 
linkage should be removed. Or, as we describe later, linking of 
clinical data with other data should be made in a framework 
where further data linkage is not possible. 
A major worry facing clinical data providers and healthcare 
systems is in any potential threats to their systems. In the UK, the 
NHS has a national level firewall that has been set up. This 
completely separates the NHS systems from the academic 
research community (which are supported through the JANET 
network) and the wider internet. Once through the NHS firewall, 
the majority of NHS systems do not have advanced access and 
authorization systems in place. Rather, the hospitals, GP 
practices and their associated IT systems are primarily protected 
through their fragmentation and lack of coordinated, 
interoperable framework. As an example, clinical information 
in one hospital or GP practice may not be readily available to 
clinicians in other hospitals. Whilst data is itself protected 
with this model, it is also not conducive to healthcare more 
generally. Major investments in the NHS IT infrastructure 
through the Connecting for Health initiative [16] are 
currently under way to rectify this situation. 
To address these concerns and challenges, the Medical 
Research Council (MRC) funded Virtual Organisations for 
Trials and Epidemiological Studies (VOTES – 
www.nesc.ac.uk/hub/projects/votes) project has developed a 
range of clinical frameworks for secure access to a rich 
variety of clinical data. The VOTES project began in October 
2005 and is in the final phases of completion. Specifically 
VOTES aimed to develop an e-Infrastructure supporting the 
various stages involved in the conduct of clinical trials and 
epidemiological studies, namely: patient recruitment 
including feasibility studies of whether a trial/study has 
sufficient patient numbers meeting the given criteria for that 
particular trial; collection of data throughout the course of the 
clinical trial/study as well as supporting overall study 
management.  
Throughout each of these stages it is paramount that the 
right information is made available to the right individuals 
(and only those individuals) to ensure both information 
governance and ethical considerations are strictly adhered to, 
and that the results of any trials can be independently 
validated according to strict and measurable criteria. One key 
aim of VOTES was to develop a framework that could be 
applied for a range of clinical trials and studies and not 
simply develop a single bespoke system for a particular trial 
say. This has been achieved through the definition and 
implementation of a variety of clinical virtual organizations 
(CVOs) offering capabilities for data access and integration. 
These systems were designed upon user-oriented role based 
access control where services and data sets were made 
available through portals according to user privileges. 
Example trials undertaken within the existing VOTES 
systems include brain trauma trials [17], paediatric 
endocrinology trials with specific focus on congenital 
anomalies [18], primary care and secondary care trials [19] 
and more recently in establishing large scale patient 
recruitment, e.g. as part of the UK Biobank project 
(www.ukbiobank.ac.uk) which aims to recruit a cohort of 
500,000 individuals for a range of clinical genetic studies. 
The latest incarnation of the VOTES framework is the 
Vanguard system which has been designed with the 
aforementioned bullet points at the forefront of the design 
process. The major achievement of the Vanguard system is 
that it supports clinical data privacy by design as opposed to 
potentially intrusive, non-validated, Grid-based technological 
solutions. 
3. Design of Vanguard 
The design of Vanguard system is based upon a range of 
principals that must be strictly adhered to. We have 
deliberately developed the system architecture and key 
components to be simplistic and intuitive. We are fully aware 
that NHS IT systems personnel and policy makers will have 
difficulties endorsing complex solutions. 
Needless to say, the Vanguard system has been developed to 
run on a variety of platforms. This has meant that proprietary 
software and protocols have been avoided. Vanguard has also 
been developed to survive network outages and hardware failure 
with minimum disruption to end-users.  
Perhaps the most important principal that we are focused upon 
in the design and implementation of the Vanguard system is with 
regard to information governance. As noted from the bullets 
before, we recognize that information must be exposed to the 
minimum extent possible or in many circumstances not at all – 
this implies that strong encryption must be used whenever data is 
exchanged between systems or temporarily stored outside of 
memory, and that datasets should be trimmed at source before 
transmission rather than on receipt. It is essential that ultimate 
control of access to datasets must reside locally with their 
owners.  
A key consideration of the Vanguard system is with regard to 
the acknowledgment of the natural wariness (skepticism) of data 
providers. Experience from several years of working with 
clinical data providers is that they simply will not allow direct 
access through their firewalls to their data. As mentioned, there 
are many good reasons for this including lack of robust security 
infrastructure across the NHS. 
Instead of direct connections through healthcare provider 
firewalls, the Vanguard system is based upon anonymous pull 
models of data linkage. Thus, rather than clinical data systems 
being queried directly, i.e. through opening of firewalls, queries 
are generated based upon a knowledge of the data sets (schemas) 
that exist at given clinical provider sites. If a given site has 
registered itself for participation in a given study, it may 
subsequently pull the generated queries into their clinical 
systems. Depending upon local security policies, these queries 
are validated and authorized, and if valid, will result in their 
execution. In short, the clinical systems are completely protected 
from inbound internet connections (and hence do not have to 
open their firewalls to the outside world!) but rather are based 
upon a model only allowing outbound connections to be 
established. The Vanguard system itself is being designed based 
upon this pull model. However the question of security must still 
be explicitly satisfied, i.e. what queries are being defined by 
whom and what artifacts are coordinating the access to and usage 
of clinical data resources to users with particular privileges.  
The Vanguard system architecture is shown in Figure 1 and 
shows the following principal components: 
• Viewer – which is used by researchers who require access 
to data; 
• Agent – which is the intermediary between other 
components; 
• Guardian – which manages access to and data release from 
local resources; 
• Banker – which logs usage and maintains use accounts for 
the clinical data access and usage; 
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Figure 1: Vanguard Architecture 
 
The roles of these components are defined as follows. 
3.1. Viewer 
The Viewer is an application run by the end-users of 
Vanguard.  The viewer provides users with an interface to 
perform the following key functions: 
• Display the different clinical data resources available to a 
particular user; 
• Facilitate construction of data requests from these 
resources; 
• Handle the datasets returned as a result of successful 
requests. 
Currently, we are primarily focusing upon the viewers being 
web based browser interfaces to portals however specific 
client-specific applications can also be supported. These 
portals provide an environment where different agents can be 
accessed and used depending upon a given user’s privileges. 
It is quite possible to have more than one agent involved in a 
given trial and study, however to begin with and to minimize 
the security risk we have focused on a model where each 
agent provides specific data linkages for a single study.  
The data available to a user within a given viewer is 
dependent upon the privileges that they possess. To support 
this, we exploit digitally signed X509-based attribute 
certificates incorporating role based access control models. 
These attributes are specific to a given study or trial and 
allow access to one or more data resources, where data 
providers themselves agree how their combined data can be 
linked in particular ways. We emphasize that these 
authorization credentials are seamless and transparent to the 
end users and are used by the underlying framework only, i.e. 
the users are not required to manage or maintain their own 
credentials as is the case for X509-based PKIs. 
Once defined, the security attributes are then used to 
enforce local access decisions – or more precisely, they are 
presented to the local data providers along with the queries 
that are generated. The combined roles and queries are then 
used to determine the authorization decision on access to the 
local data depending upon local authorization policy.   
3.2. Agent 
Agents play a pivotal part in the Vanguard system. An agent 
will typically perform the following roles: 
 
• They enable communication between other system 
components including viewers, guardians, bankers and 
potentially other agents; 
• They accept the generated user queries and manage the 
query requests themselves including their transfer, delivery 
and dealing with the associated security; 
• They collate and manage the results of the submitted 
queries. 
Agents are at the fulcrum of the Vanguard system in that they are 
responsible for ensuring both the secure communications 
between the different system artifacts and their coordination. A 
key role of an agent is in the generation of unique hash keys to 
support secure communications. These are passed through to the 
various Guardians that they help to coordinate. Through hashing 
of data items that should remain anonymous, data can be 
securely linked across sites without direct data disclosure being 
made. Key to this is in understanding the visibility of data and 
whether it can be directly accessed; used only for linking; or not 
accessible at all.  
Agents also provide capabilities for defining the plans by 
which queries generated via a user through a viewer can be both 
formulated and subsequently enacted. Thus for example, if a 
particular data provider has a certain data element to be hashed 
or closed, then the Agent is responsible for ensuring that the 
appropriate hash keys are distributed and for removing the final 
hashed values once data has been linked across sites. 
The Vanguard system supports a range of secure protocols 
reflecting the variety of infrastructures at clinical data provider 
sites. Examples of these include web security models exploiting 
X509 credentials for example as well as SSL/TLS for 
message/channel security respectively.  
3.3. Guardian 
Guardians act as a controlled secure gateway between the local 
data at clinical data provider sites and external Agents. One or 
more Guardian systems will be installed at every site which 
provides a data resource for the system. Guardians typically 
perform the following roles within the Vanguard system: 
• Construction of site specific security policies; 
• Describe the local data and security policies to known and 
trusted Agents; 
• Enforce security policies related to incoming (pulled) 
queries; 
• Handle incoming data requests from Agents; 
• Export results of requests to Agents according to site 
specific data release policies. 
A range of Guardians will exist within any given system – each 
managed and maintained by local data providers and adopting 
existing technologies and systems in place locally. 
Guardians also allow data providers to make available their 
data models and importantly the way in which the data 
associated with these data models may be access and/or linked. 
Thus key to data access and linkage is knowledge of the 
underlying data models that are in place, i.e. the data schemas 
themselves. Based upon this and through negotiation with 
relevant ethics/oversight committees and local data providers 
themselves associated with a specific study, data might have be 
assigned three main forms of access privileges: 
• Open – in which case the Guardian is willing to supply the 
actual value of the data field; 
• Hashed – in which case the Guardian is willing to 
supply a hashed (and hence anonymised) value of the 
data; 
• Closed – in which case the Guardian will not supply the 
value, but is willing to run queries for example that 
involve it as a selector. 
We note that the clinical databases accessible within 
Vanguard may well have other fields which do not form part 
of this system. The existence of such fields is hidden entirely 
from the Agents. As a security precaution for data providers, 
Guardian `owners’ are advised to create a set of read-only 
views of their data resources which contain the fields they are 
willing for a Guardian to process, and which do not contain 
any other fields. 
Prior to running any queries, Guardians must supply a 
description of the data that it has to the Agent. This will 
typically contain a list of the names and types of the data 
resources a Guardian is managing; the version information of 
the Guardian and a list of the features that a Guardian can 
support. Initially the Vanguard system has primarily focused 
upon relational database resources supporting SQL-based 
queries hence this kind of information includes the list 
(names) of tables in the database; a textual description of the 
database contents; for each table a list of names of fields in 
table; text description of the table contents and the number of 
rows in each table; for each field in each table information 
might include the field type (int, string etc); the protection 
level (Open, Hashed, Closed); a textual description of the 
field contents; alternative nomenclature(s) for the field, e.g. 
SNOMED clinical codes; nullability; the uniqueness of the 
field; relationship to other fields, e.g. is-a-foreign-key; and 
the size of the field itself.  
In short, the Guardian must provide detailed information on 
the data model for the databases it makes available so that 
this can then be used for data access and linkage by Agents. 
We emphasize that this is purely the data model that is being 
made available via the Guardian and not the data itself. 
3.4. Banker 
The Banker in the Vanguard system is responsible for 
managing resources across the whole system. Bankers have 
the following main roles: 
• Maintain a log of actions taken across given trial 
systems – specifically through recording the queries 
generated by the viewers/agents and those sent to the 
guardians (including those that were denied); 
• Maintain charging accounts for users – to ensure for 
example that a single user is not over-utilizing the 
federated data available through the Vanguard system. 
3.5. Vanguard Component Interaction Scenario  
The interactions between the previous components in 
supporting secure anonymous data access and linkage 
proceeds as follows. In the first instance, we assume that 
ethical approval for a given trial is applied for and granted as 
per typical procedures. In the UK this might for example be 
through applying for Multicentre Research Ethics Committee 
(MREC) or Local Research Ethics Committee (LREC) 
approval. In addition, we assume the precondition that an 
Agent for this particular trial has requested the data-schemas 
from all Guardians it is aware of. This includes information on 
the visibility of the data sets themselves, e.g. whether they are 
open, closed or hashed. The trial coordinator will then use a 
Viewer to request the data-schemas available from that Agent to 
construct particular queries.  
A trial coordinator may construct particular views of data for 
the different roles of individuals involved in a particular trial, 
e.g. a nurse may issue the following queries, or an ethical 
oversight committee member may see all data etc. The Vanguard 
system extends the existing VOTES systems to support such 
role-based scenarios. We outline the basic functionality here in 
terms of creating and executing queries and retrieving query 
results since they are similar irrespective of the role in the study. 
3.5.1. Query Creation 
To create a specific query the end-user uses the Viewer to 
construct a query based on the data-schema available to them. 
The query is transmitted from the Viewer to an Agent, where it is 
stored and given a unique ID. 
3.5.2. Query Execution 
To start executing a query the Viewer transmits a signal to the 
Agent requesting that a previously-stored query is executed.  
This is accompanied by a public-key generated by the end-user 
(PKU). The Agent verifies that the query is permitted and 
produces an action plan decomposing the query into local-
queries across any Guardian system(s) required. Fields are 
tagged as either being required for external-joining (within the 
Agent) or purely for returning to the Viewer. 
The Agent generates the queries and either issues them directly 
to the Guardian systems (where they allow direct querying), or 
signs and stores the queries. Each non-directly querying 
Guardian will then periodically pull these queries down and if 
valid/authorized, return the results associated with it. The query 
requests themselves are accompanied by PKU, a public-key for 
the Agent (PKA), and a unique (per-query) hashing key 
generated by the Agent (HA). 
To execute the parts of this query each Guardian checks the 
local-query against its local access-schema to verify it is 
permitted. If satisfying the local policy, the Guardian executes 
the query. Fields tagged for external-joining by the Agent are 
hash-encoded using HA. Fields tagged for returning to the 
Viewer are encrypted using PKU. The whole datasets are then 
encrypted using the PKA and returned to the Agent along with 
the cost for executing the query in resource credits. 
On receipt of the local-queries the Agent stores the resultant 
datasets until all partial queries have returned. Once all queries 
have returned, the Agent transmits a signal to the Banker with 
the action taken and the number of resource credits used, e.g. the 
number of result sets. In addition, the agent joins the partial 
queries according to any external-joining fields. It will also 
discard any external-joining fields that the end-user has not 
requested or that the end user does not have the privilege to 
view. Finally it sets a query flag to indicate that the query is 
completed. 
3.5.3. Query Retrieval 
Whilst a query is being executed the user is able to use the 
Viewer to see the state of progress of the query. Once the query-
complete flag has been set on the Agent, the end-user uses the 
Viewer to download the results of the query from the Agent. 
At this point, the Agent deletes all data returned by the query 
and passes all logging/charging data to the Banker. Once 
acknowledged by the Banker, the Agent deletes this 
information from its cache. 
3.6. Example of Vanguard System 
To understand how these various components can be used for 
secure data linkage within the Vanguard system we consider 
the following example. We assume that a range of clinical 
datasets are distributed across clinical data provider sites 
alpha, gamma and delta as depicted in Figure 2 hosting the 
datasets stay and birth, linkage and disease respectively.  
 
alpha.birth alpha.stay gamma.linkage delta.disease 
Int sex
Real weight
Date dob
Integer mother
String nhs
Type Field
Integerstatus
Integerdays
Integermother
IntegerhospID
TypeField
Bool Active 
Int chi 
String nhs 
Type Field 
Boolhepatitis
Bool
Intchi
TypeField
hiv
Figure 2: Example Data Linkage Scenario 
 
With the above tables we assume that the National Health 
Service (NHS) number in table alpha.birth, and the 
community health index number (CHI) number in data 
resource delta.disease must both be hashed (represented here 
through different colouring). Similarly, the HIV information 
in the database delta.disease is closed and hence cannot be 
disclosed.  With this data model, in place we wish to answer 
the following query: How many days did mothers with HIV 
stay in hospital? 
The SQL to run this query directly is represented in Figure 
3. 
SELECT alpha.stay.days WHERE alpha.stay.mother = alpha.birth.mother 
  AND alpha.birth.nhs = gamma.linkage.nhs 
  AND gamma.linkage.nhs = gamma.linkage.chi 
  AND gamma.linkage.chi = delta.disease.chi 
  AND delta.disease.hiv = true 
Figure 3: Direct Querying of Clinical Data Sets 
 
However, given that certain information associated with these 
data resources is not directly visible to the Agents and hence 
to the end users via the Viewers, the actual SQL plans that is 
generated by the Agents needs to link the data and remove 
unnecessary information or data which is flagged as being for 
restricted disclosure. In this case with the NHS and HIV data 
information limitations the SQL plan generated by the Agent 
in this case is shown in Figure 4. 
 
SELECT alpha.stay.days,H(alpha.birth.nhs) 
         WHERE alpha.stay.mother = alpha.birth.mother 
 SELECT H(gamma.linkage.nhs),H(gamma.linkage.chi) 
 SELECT H(delta.disease.chi) WHERE delta.disease.hiv = true; 
 Join on H(*.nhs) AND H(*.chi), then remove H(*.nhs) and H(*.chi) 
Figure 4: Anonymous Linkage of Clinical Data Sets 
 
In this case, the data that is restricted, e.g. the NHS number in 
alpha.birth, is hashed (and hence anonymised). These hash 
values are unique since a different hash key is used each time 
by the Agents and it is guaranteed that the same hash key will 
not be used by the Agents. Thus through the use of hashed 
information across the different data resources, data linkage can 
be made, yet direct data disclosure is avoided. Furthermore, the 
final line of the query above then removes the hashed values to 
ensure that the final resultant data set protects the required 
confidentiality of the data providers. 
It should be emphasized that the primary benefit of this 
scenario, is that no identifying information is released from the 
data providers yet data linkage is made across different data 
provider sites. This model thus satisfies the data providers 
worries of their data potentially linked in unforeseen ways with 
other data resources. The result of the query will then simply be 
the number of days that mothers with HIV stayed in hospital, 
without any information identifying which mothers for example. 
4.  Vanguard Implementation 
The implementation of the Vanguard system has largely focused 
upon the development of Viewers, Agents and Guardians with 
the development of the Banker primarily at the design phase 
only. This has been deliberate. Building confidence in these key 
components is paramount and auditing and charging “after the 
fact” is regarded as not as immediately essential for the various 
stakeholders involved.  
To understand the interplay between the various components 
we describe a typical collaboration involving different clinical 
data providers. These include data providers offering hospital 
secondary care data through SCIstore software; primary care GP 
data through GPASS software, and Scottish Morbidity Records 
data made through the Information Services Division of the 
NHS. Each of these data providers have data securely stored 
whose schema is known and understood across the project 
partners.  
In the first prototype of Vanguard, we implemented a Viewer 
for a particular Virtual Organization (VO) called VOTES2. This 
was primarily used to test out the basic technologies and the data 
sets that were used here are representative only. In the VOTES2 
trial, some data items were identified that should be made 
available and linked across the partner sites in a secure setting. 
As shown in Figure 5, these included a description of the 
particular chronic disease of interest; the diagnosis of this 
disease; information related to the family name and the particular 
patient id. The patient information was not to be made available 
directly through the Viewer, however it was agreed that for the 
VOTES2 study, the data could be linked on a particular patient 
identifier as indicated in the visibility information of Figure 5. 
Based upon this Viewer, a user is able to create a query which 
is encrypted with the Viewers public key and sent to an Agent 
along with the public key of the individual themselves, e.g. 
PKV(Qx,PKUx) where PKV is the public key of the viewer, Qx a 
particular query to be run and PKUx the public key of the User. 
The Agent verifies the Viewer key, checks the validity of the 
request, and subsequently defines a data linkage strategy based 
upon the agreements set out in the VOTES2 collaboration, i.e. a 
federated query needs to be generated which will be pulled down 
by the Guardians protecting access to the SCIstore, GPASS and 
SMR data sets respectively. At this point a unique hash key (HA) 
is also generated by the Agent. 
Figure 5: Viewer Interface for VOTES2 Clinical Trial 
At some later time, a Guardian involved in the VOTES2 
study will check to see if any queries are generated that it 
needs to deal with. When this is the case it pulls these queries 
in and checks that they are appropriately signed, i.e. from an 
Agent it trusts. For the SMR resource this looks like 
PKA(SMRQuery,HAx,PKUx) where PKA is the Agents public 
key, SMRQuery the query that is requested to be run against 
the SMR data set, HAx the unique hash key generated and 
PKUx the users public key. A typical query that a Guardian 
will see is shown in Figure 6.  
 
Figure 6: Agent Generated Query for a Guardian 
Similar queries are pulled in to and verified by other 
Guardians involved in the VOTES2 study, i.e. for SMR and 
GPASS. Each data provider will assess the query (either 
through automated RBAC or similar approaches) or through 
non-automated mechanisms, e.g. discussions with 
organizational representatives. Assuming that the 
organization is satisfied with the request, the query is run. 
The data that can be linked only is hashed with the unique 
hash key from the Agent. The other contents of the message, 
i.e. the releasable data are encrypted using the public key of 
the individual user and the message as a whole encrypted and 
signed using the Agent’s public key. For the SMR resource 
this looks like PKA(PKUx(SMRres),HAxSMRres) where 
HAxSMRres in this case will be the hashed patient id which 
as defined by the Viewer in Figure 5 cannot be seen directly, but 
can be linked upon. 
After receiving similar encrypted, hashed and encrypted results 
from all of the Guardians, the Agent can subsequently: decrypt 
the data using its own private key; join the resultant hashed data 
sets using the unique hash values that were generated previously, 
i.e.PKA-1(Join(HAx-1(HAxSMRres)…),HAx-1(HAxGPASSres)…),HAx-1 
(HAxSCIres)…)) where the “…” represent the other data sets that 
themselves are encrypted using the users public key. Once joined 
on the hashed keys, these other data sets are then themselves 
encrypted using the Viewer public key and released to the end 
users, i.e. PKV(PKUx(Joined Linked Anonymised Data)). The 
user, i.e. the holder of the private key then is thus able to decrypt 
the joined, linked and anonymised data from the Viewer. A 
typical Vanguard query result is shown in Figure 7. 
 
Figure 7: Viewer Results Interface 
Once the results are obtained, the associated query result sets and 
are deleted from the Agent, however associated information of 
which queries were run, by which Viewer on behalf of which 
user are sent to the Banker for future auditing purposes.  
It should be emphasized that no component in the Vanguard 
system is able to capture and link information directly. The 
Agents generate unique hash keys which are used only for data 
linkage of agreed fields (here patient id). The actual data 
associated with these patients is encrypted using the public key 
of the end users themselves. This linking and anonymisation 
based upon a pull-oriented model offers the possibility for new 
mechanisms of interacting with clinical providers which 
underpin a range of clinical-research collaborations.  
5. Conclusions  
The work on the Vanguard system is on-going however we have 
defined the components and the interactions between them that 
will overcome the immediate concerns from the clinical data 
providers as has arisen throughout the course of the VOTES 
project. Nevertheless the work we have described here is not 
complete and numerous challenges remain to be addressed. 
Some of the most critical challenges that we envisage include 
scalability. The scenarios outlined in this paper are at a small and 
understandable scale. In real clinical systems in Scotland such as 
SCIstore, GPASS and the Scottish Morbidity Records amongst 
others however we are often dealing with database models 
comprising several hundred tables with complex field and 
primary/foreign structures. Furthermore it is often the case that 
few clinical data centers are well positioned to disclose what data 
tables/fields should be made available. In the UK numerous 
solutions exist and are outsourced to commercial software 
providers who are often unwilling to disclose their detailed 
data models. As such, knowing what data can be disclosed 
and linked is often not a trivial exercise. This is often further 
complicated through fields that can be used for textual 
information on a given patient for example and including 
identifying patient information for example. To address such 
scenarios, we believe the only way is to develop the systems 
in close liaison with the clinical providers and only after they 
are completely satisfied that the systems meet their rigorous 
information governance policies can they be used in a truly 
live setting.   
A second challenge that we expect to face in the roll-out of 
the Vanguard system is with regards to data disclosure risks 
arising due to global data models. Thus it is only when the 
various data providers have agreed to release their data sets 
that the issues of identifying data sets can arise. As one 
example, it would be quite possible to extend the alpha.birth 
data provider given above with the patient name and data of 
birth and allow open access to this information, but this may 
well be opposed to the data disclosure policy of delta.disease 
for example. It is only when considering the joining or union 
of these data sets on the CHI and NHS numbers in the 
example above that such policy conflicts can be identified. 
We also note that many of the challenges faced in obtaining 
access to clinical data stem from researchers being 
considered as external to the clinical and administrative 
bodies such as the NHS. To overcome these issues, the NeSC 
team is in the process of being allocated NHS honorary 
contracts through the work on the breast cancer tissue bank 
for example.  
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